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INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Court's January 26, 2007 Supplemental Brief Order, 
Dr. Chamberlain and Central Utah Medical Clinic (collectively "Dr. Chamberlain") 
submit this supplemental brief in response to Rebekah Munson's ("Ms. Munson") brief 
supplementing Point III of her opening brief In Point III, Ms. Munson asks the Court to 
overturn Doe v. Maret 1999 UT 74, 984 P.2d 980, which interprets the confidentiality 
provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"). The Act provides that 
all proceedings before the prelitigation review panel are "confidential, privileged, and 
immune from civil process." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(d). 
In Doe, the Court held that "because the notice of intent serves as the basis for the 
prelitigation panel review, and because it is often utilized as part of the prelitigation 
review, it is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." 1999 UT 74 at f21. 
Here, the trial court followed Doe in ruling that Ms. Munson had violated the 
confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings by providing to Dr. Jacobs—her testifying 
expert—the notice of intent and an opinion letter, both of which were prepared for, 
provided to, and considered by the prelitigation panel. (R. 259-60.) The trial court then 
disqualified Dr. Jacobs because Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could not cross-examine him 
about his reliance on these documents without further violating confidentiality. (Id.) 
In Ms. Munson's supplemental brief, she advances two arguments. First, she 
argues that Doe frustrates the purpose of the Act because it discourages litigants from 
"obtaining or using an expert evaluation in the prelitigation phase of the case," which 
reduces the likelihood of settlement. (Aplt. Sup. Br. at 2.) Second, Ms. Munson argues 
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that Doe produces "absurd results" because Dr. Jacobs could have learned the 
information from alternative sources. (Id. at 4.) Both arguments fail. 
First, Doe does not discourage litigants from using experts before the prehtigation 
panel, but instead merely prevents public disclosure of the materials submitted to the 
panel. As long as the materials submitted to and discussions before the panel are kept 
confidential, there is nothing to discourage the use of experts. The confidentiality 
provisions of the Act do not apply to documents—such as medical records—that would 
have existed were there no prehtigation review panels. It instead makes confidential 
those materials prepared for and submitted to the panel. The Act does not discourage the 
use of experts. 
Second, it is no more absurd that settlement discussions or attorney-client 
communications cannot be disclosed even though their content may be available from 
other sources than it is that proceedings before the prehtigation panel cannot be disclosed 
when their content may be available from other sources. Contrary to Ms. Munson's 
assertion, when information is available from other sources the confidentiality 
requirements of the Act are less burdensome not more. This case proves the point: Had 
Dr. Jacobs relied only upon non-prelitigation sources, Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could 
have cross-examined him about them, and the parties would not be here. 
As demonstrated below, Doe's interpretation of section 78-14-12(l)(d) is not only 
perfectly sensible, but is supported by the section's plain language, its legislative history, 
and the legislative purpose of the Act. The Court should affirm. 
437590 
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ARGUMENT 
L The Plain Language of the Act Requires Documents Provided to the 
Prelitigation Review Panel Be Kept Confidential 
Doe is consistent with the plain language of the Act. The Court "ascertain[s] the 
legislature's intent by looking to the statute's plain meaning, and to its various provisions 
viewed as a whole." State v. Bohne, 2002 UT 116, f 15, 63 P.3d 63. The Act requires all 
medical malpractice plaintiffs initially to present their case to a prelitigation review 
panel, which determines whether the malpractice claim has merit. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-14-12 to -14. To ensure candor before the panel, the Act provides that all 
"[proceedings conducted under authority of this section are confidential, privileged, and 
immune from civil process." Id. at § 78-14-12(l)(d). As an added measure, the Act also 
provides that "[e]vidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and 
its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an 
action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 
§78-14-15(1). 
In Doe, the Court recognized that documents provided to and considered by the 
panel are part of the proceedings: "because the notice of intent serves as the basis for the 
prelitigation panel review, and because it is often utilized as part of the prelitigation 
review, it is part of the proceeding and must be kept confidential." 1999 UT 74 at Tf21. 
The Court's interpretation of "proceedings" to include documents submitted to the panel 
comports with its plain meaning, which is "the form or manner of conducting judicial [or 
administrative] business." Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (6th ed. 1990). The panel's 
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business includes reviewing the documents submitted by the parties, and thus, these 
documents are "part" of the proceedings. 
This interpretation is confirmed by section 78-14-13(1), which provides that "[n]o 
record of the proceedings is required," and then clarifies that it does not mean only that 
no transcript is required, but also that the panel will not retain "evidence, documents, and 
exhibits." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-13(1). Elsewhere, the Act uses "prelitigation 
hearings" instead of "proceedings" when the language does not encompass "evidence, 
documents, and exhibits." Id. at § 78-14-12(1). Doe was therefore correct in interpreting 
section 78-14-12(l)(d) to encompass all documents presented to the panel as "part of the 
proceedings." 1999 UT at 74 ^[21. 
Doe was also correct to hold that any part of the proceedings—including the 
notice of intent and opinion letter—is confidential. The plain language of section 78-14-
15(1) provides that any "evidence of the proceedings" is inadmissible, meaning any 
documents presented to the panel are inadmissible. However, section 78-14-12(l)(d)— 
the section interpreted in Doe and applied by the trial court—goes much further by 
making such documents not just inadmissible, but "confidential, privileged, and immune 
from civil process." Id. The plain language of the Act supports Doe's holding that 
documents submitted to the panel cannot be disclosed to the general public because they 
are "part" of the proceedings and are therefore confidential. 
And because the confidentiality is imposed by the Legislature, neither the parties 
nor the panel may waive confidentiality without statutory authorization, which does not 
exist here. The Act outlines exceptions to the confidentiality requirement, such as when 
4 
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the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing needs information about the 
proceedings to detect or prove "unprofessional or unlawful conduct." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-15(3). However, the Act does not create a similar exception permitting 
Ms. Munson to share confidential prelitigation documents with an expert who will testify 
in open court simply because it serves her private litigation purposes. 
The Court has refused to create exceptions to plainly worded confidentiality 
requirements in the past. For instance, in Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic v. 
Frederick, the Court refused to create an exception to a legislatively imposed 
confidentiality on communications with family therapists. 890 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995). 
In Frederick, the statute enumerated four exceptions to the confidentiality requirement, 
and the Court refused to create an additional exception because "amendments to correct 
the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial interpretation." IcL at 
1021. As the Court explained, "it is not our prerogative to rewrite that section or to 
question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy underlying it."1 Id 
Ms. Munson asks the Court to overturn Doe and do here what the Court declined 
to do in Frederick—create an exception to confidentiality provided by statute. In this 
1
 When the Utah Legislature intends to provide an exception to confidentiality provided 
by statute, it does so expressly. Compare Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-8-8, -13 (2002) 
(information disclosed to Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is confidential unless waived or 
mining operation terminates); Utah Code Ann. § 34-38-13 (2004) (results of employer 
tests for drugs or alcohol are confidential subject to exceptions listed inlhe statute), with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3e-2 (1986) (identity of person informing about illegal activity at 
schools is confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-313 (1981) (information on abortions is 
confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-37 (1971) (information provided by marriage 
license applicant is strictly confidential); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-17.1 (1969) 
(communications to domestic relations counselor confidential). 
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case, the confidential documents are a notice of intent and opinion letter that were 
presented to the prelitigation panel and later provided to an expert who would testify in 
open court. The plain language of the Act does not describe an exception for testifying 
experts, and the Court should not create one. Ms. Munson breached the confidentiality 
requirement in section 7S-14~\2(\)(d) when she provided the notice of intent and opinion 
letter to her testifying expert.2 The Court should affirm. 
II. The Legislative History of the Act Confirms Doe Was Correctly Decided 
The holding of Doe is confirmed by the history surrounding the enactment of 
section 78-14-12 in 1985. World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 
P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) (if plain language does not decide the proper interpretation of 
a statute, the court "seek[s] guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations."). While the floor debates shed no light on the question before the Court, 
a letter from the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel reveals that the 
Legislature modeled section 78-14-12 on a then-similar Idaho statute. See Legislative 
Review Letter from the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, attached as 
2
 At times, Ms. Munson suggests that she did not breach the confidentiality requirement 
because all she did was provide the documents to her expert, and that act alone did not 
disclose any documents to the public. (Aplt. Reply Br. at 9-10.) However, this is also 
inconsistent with Doe, where the Court held a party had breached the confidentiality 
requirement by attaching the notice of intent to a brief. Doe, 1999 UT 74 at f21. 
Attaching a notice of intent to a brief submitted to the Court no more discloses the notice 
of intent to the public than providing it to a testifying expert does. However, the 
important point in Doe is that by attaching the document to a brief the document would 
thereby be accessible to the public, as briefs are made public. Here, by providing the 
notice of intent and opinion letter to a testifying expert, Ms. Munson similarly opened 
those documents to the public when the expert later testified. 
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Exhibit A (stating that the statute is "patterned after Idaho's statute"). The history of the 
Idaho statute confirms that all documents presented to a prelitigation panel—such as a 
notice of intent or opinion letter—were intended to remain confidential. 
Before Idaho's statute was amended in 1990, it had a confidentiality provision 
virtually identical to those contained in the Act. The Act has two sections governing how 
evidence concerning the proceedings can (not) be used—sections 78-14-12(l)(d) and 78-
14-15(1). The former provides that all "[proceedings conducted under authority of this 
section are confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-14-12(l)(d). The latter provides that "[ejvidence of the proceedings conducted by 
the medical review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not 
admissible as evidence in an action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of 
competent jurisdiction." Id. at § 78-14-15(1). Idaho's version combined these two 
provisions, but was otherwise identical: "Proceedings conducted or maintained under the 
authority of this act shall at all times be confidential, privileged and immune from civil 
process and evidence of them or results, findings or determinations thereof shall be 
inadmissible in any civil or other action or proceeding." Idaho Code § 6-1001 (1976). 
The subsequent history of Idaho's version confirms that "proceedings" include 
documents submitted to the panel. In 1990, the Idaho Legislature amended section 6-
1001, removed the confidentiality provision, and replaced it with a statement that the 
proceedings shall be "subject to disclosure according to chapter 3, title 9, Idaho Code." 
Idaho Code § 6-1001 (1990). Chapter 3, title 9, of the Idaho Code is Idaho's Public 
Records Act, which specifies that all records created by a public entity are open for 
7 
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public inspection. Idaho Code §§ 9-337 through -347. Realizing the Public Records Act 
could not apply to all public records, the Idaho Legislature specified categories of records 
that were exempt from public inspection. Idaho Code §§ 9-340-340H. 
When outlining the exemptions relevant to Idaho's prelitigation statute, the Idaho 
Legislature did not simply exempt all "proceedings" before a prelitigation panel, but 
instead exempted only a subset of the proceedings, namely "records, findings, 
determinations, and decisions." Idaho Code § 9-340C. The Idaho Legislature's choice of 
language is revealing: The "records" of the prelitigation panel are "part" of its 
proceedings; otherwise, the exemption makes no sense. This is precisely how this Court 
interpreted Utah's statute in Doe. 
The failure of the Utah Legislature to articulate any exceptions to the Act's 
confidentiality requirement bolsters the conclusion that section 78-14-12(l)(d) 
encompasses all documents provided to the panel. As Ms. Munson points out in the 
opening brief, in 2002—three years after the Court decided Doe—the Utah Legislature 
amended section 78-14-12, but did not amend subsection 78-14-12(l)(d). (Aplt. Br. at 
10.) If Doe were plainly incorrect or had led to "absurd results" as Ms. Munson 
contends, one would have expected the Legislature to have created the very exception for 
3
 Other states have followed Idaho's lead in creating express exceptions to the 
confidentiality of prelitigation proceedings by legislation. See, e.g., 24 Maine Revised 
Statute § 2857 (enumerating a number of exceptions); Louisiana Statute Ann. 
§ 40:1299.39.1 (specifying that members of the panel may be called as witnesses); 
Kansas Stat. § 65-4904 (stating that the prelitigation panel's determination "shall be 
admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and either party may subpoena any and all 
members of the panel as witnesses for examination relating to the issues at trial"); Va. 
Code Ann. § 8.01-581.8 (same); Ark. Stat. § 09.55.536 (same). 
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testifying experts that Ms. Munson urges the Court to create. The history of the Act, as 
well as the history of the Idaho act it was patterned after, confirms what the plain 
language of the Act already says: Documents presented to the panel must be kept 
confidential, and there is no exception to this requirement for expert witnesses who will 
testify in open court. The Court should affirm. 
III. Doe Is Consistent with the Purpose of the Act and Expresses Sound Public 
Policy 
Doe is also consistent with the purpose of the Act and expresses sound public 
policy. First, keeping the entirety of the proceedings before the panel—including the 
documents provided to the panel—confidential furthers the stated purpose of the Act to 
"expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. As 
with settlement negotiations, the parties are much more likely to communicate with 
candor if their statements are protected from disclosure and cannot later be used in 
litigation. Second, keeping all materials provided to the prelitigation panel confidential 
creates a bright line rule that litigants and trial courts can easily follow, just as they have 
done since Doe was decided in 1999. For both reasons, the Court should reaffirm Doe 
and affirm the trial court's ruling. 
A. Doe Expedites Settlement by Encouraging Candor Before the Panel 
Doe furthers the purpose of the prelitigation proceedings by encouraging frank 
discussion before the panel to "expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims." Id. at 
§ 78-14-2. Parties must feel free to discuss the merits of the claim candidly without fear 
that any admission or misstatement may later be used in litigation. Such candor permits 
437590 
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each party to evaluate the claim before it is filed, which increases the chances of 
settlement. 
A similar purpose is achieved by the attorney-client privilege, Rule 408 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence, and keeping confidential alternative dispute resolution 
proceedings such as mediation. See Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Res. 
Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is 
"intended to encourage candor between attorney and client and promote the best possible 
representation of the client"); State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58,1J46, 27 P.3d 1115 ("Rule 408 
is premised on the idea that encouraging settlement of civil claims justifies excluding 
otherwise probative evidence from civil lawsuits.") (quotations and citation omitted); 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber v. Chiles Power Supply, 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(stating that "[tjhere exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters 
discussed by parties during settlement negotiations . . . [because] in order for settlement 
talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their communications"). 
In fact, the candid discussion permitted by maintaining the confidentiality of 
settlement conferences or mediations is so important that other courts—like the trial court 
in this case—have imposed sanctions for violating this confidentiality. For example, the 
Utah Court of Appeals has admonished counsel for violating the confidentiality of a 
court-ordered mediation. See Lyons v. Booker, 1999 UT App 172; 982 P.2d 1142. 
Following the Tenth Circuit, the court noted that "the guarantee of confidentiality is 
essential to the proper functioning of an appellate settlement conference program and 
revealing statements or comments made at a settlement conference is a serious breach of 
10 
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confidentiality." Id. at f 11 (quotations and citations omitted). The court then reiterated 
the policy behind the confidentiality requirement: "to be successful, participants must 
trust that matters discussed at a conference will not be revealed." Id. 
Two rulings in a recent Michigan case further illustrate the point. See Irwin 
Seating Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., No. l:04-cv-568, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
10472 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2007).4 In Irwin, the court disqualified an expert witness 
from testifying because the expert had been exposed to confidential mediation 
communications. Id at * 17. Like Ms. Munson, the plaintiff had provided its experts 
with "confidential mediation statements" and the experts reviewed these documents in 
preparing their opinions. Id. at *1. Also like Ms. Munson, the plaintiff contended 
(i) "that disclosure to its own retained experts was disclosure to agents of itself, the 
represented party, and therefore was not a breach of confidentiality" and (ii) even if it 
was a breach, disqualification was too severe a sanction. Id. at *7. The court disagreed, 
ruling that "[bjecause the information in issue is confidential, Defendants will be unable 
to fully challenge the expert's assertions that their opinions were not influenced by 
confidential settlement knowledge." Id. at *3. 
In Irwin, the district court affirmed a recommendation by the magistrate judge, 
who explained that disqualification was not too harsh because, like here, the plaintiffs 
had "placed [their] experts at risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were 
not entitled." Irwin Seating Co. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., No. l:04-cv-568, 
4
 A copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit B. 
11 
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2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86988 at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2006).5 It was enough to 
warrant disqualification that the extent to which the confidential information affected the 
experts "in shaping their approaches and opinion, is not truly knowable nor easily 
remediable." Id. Like the trial court here, Irwin considers disqualification of an expert 
appropriate for a breach of confidentiality committed when a party provides documents to 
a testifying expert. 
The rule announced in Doe similarly furthers the purpose of the Act. The 
confidentiality envisioned by the Legislature in enacting section 78-14-12(l)(d) can 
accomplish the purpose of promoting frank discussion in the prelitigation proceedings 
only if courts can sanction litigants for violating confidentiality. Far from prejudicing 
litigants, Doe provides them an opportunity to resolve a case before incurring needless, 
burdensome litigation expenses. All documents created for the prelitigation hearing and 
submitted to the panel must be kept confidential to further the Act's purpose. 
B. Doe Announced a Bright Line Rule that Is Easy to Follow 
Perhaps the most important aspect of Doe, however, is that it announces a bright 
line rule that is easy to understand and follow. The rule merely requires all parties to 
keep confidential any document created for and utilized by the prelitigation panel. If the 
document would not exist but for the prelitigation requirements specified in the Act, it 
cannot be disclosed. Thus, medical records, for example, are not made confidential 
merely by being provided to the panel because they would have been available even if 
there were no prelitigation requirements. The documents at issue here—a notice of intent 
5
 A copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit C. 
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and an opinion letter (created for the panel)—however, would not exist but for the 
prelitigation proceedings, and therefore, they are confidential. As demonstrated below, 
this rule applies to nearly all settlement materials, and there is no reason for a different 
rule riddled with exceptions for the prelitigation setting. 
The rale announced in Doe does not prejudice any party because it accounts for 
the distinction between the underlying facts of a case and the documents specifically 
prepared for, presented to, and considered by the prelitigation panel. While section 78-
14-12(l)(d) plainly forbids disclosure of documents specifically prepared for and 
presented to the panel, it does not render every bit of information contained in those 
documents confidential and inadmissible at trial. 
This distinction between underlying facts and the confidential communication 
employing those facts is reflected in both the attorney-client privilege and Rule 408. One 
cannot make facts inadmissible merely by uttering them to one's attorney. See Jackson v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1972) (stating 
that a person "cannot foreclose the discovery process by the simple expedient of 
funneling [information] into its counsel's custody"). Similarly, Rule 408 expressly draws 
the distinction, as it "does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations." 
UtahR. Evid. 408. 
While reciting facts to one's attorney or during settlement negotiations does not 
make the facts subject to Rule 408, any communications prepared for and exchanged 
during settlement negotiations are inadmissible, even if they contain information that is 
13 
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otherwise admissible. Once this common-sense distinction is drawn and applied to 
section 78-14-12(l)(d), Ms. Munson's argument that Doe produces absurd results fades 
away. The only burden the rule places on plaintiffs is the same burden that existed before 
prelitigation panels were created: Plaintiffs must prove their claims using only evidence 
that would have existed if there were no prelitigation process.6 
Thus, Ms. Munson's expert was free to review any of the independent facts of Ms. 
Munson's claim in developing his opinion. It was Ms. Munson's choice not to follow 
this course, and instead to breach the confidentiality of the prelitigation proceedings that 
tainted her expert. See Irwin, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86988 at *4 (plaintiffs placed their 
experts and their opinions at "risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were 
not entitled"). The rule announced in Doe does not prejudice litigants. 
There is no reason to depart from the current bright line rule and carve out the 
exception Ms. Munson urges. As the trial court recognized, to do so would create a 
"confused and unpredictable jurisprudence that would undermine the purposes" of the 
Act, including reducing the chances of "early settlement in an environment in which 
parties can speak candidly without fear of subsequent disclosure of the proceedings, and 
critical documents produced therein." (R. at 555, p. 44). The Court should affirm. 
6
 Unlike in earlier briefing, Ms. Munson appears to concede this point in her supplemental 
brief: "Even if the documents in question were rendered confidential by statute, the 
actual information that was contained therein was information that could and would have 
been accessible by any other expert who was subsequently retained to offer further 
assistance." (Aplt. Sup. Br. at 4.) 
437590 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should reaffirm Doe's holding that the confidentiality specified in 
section 78-14-12(l)(d) applies to all communications—written or otherwise—that are 
made during prelitigation proceedings. The purpose of the Act is to provide "procedural 
changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims/' which like the purpose of 
the attorney-client privilege and Rule 408, can be accomplished only by keeping all such 
communications private. In fact, the confidentiality requirement in section 78-14-
12(l)(d) is more stringent than the attorney-client privilege, as it cannot be waived by a 
party; and it is more stringent than Rule 408. as section 78-14-12(l)(d) makes all 
proceedings before the panel "confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." 
The plain language, legislative history, and legislative purpose all support Doe's 
holding that litigants must keep documents submitted to a prelitigation panel confidential. 
Following Doe, the trial court ruled that Ms. Munson had breached confidentiality by 
providing her testifying expert the notice of intent and opinion letter. The trial court then 
appropriately disqualified Ms. Munson's expert because Dr. Chamberlain's counsel could 
not cross-examine him about his reliance on those documents. The Court should affirm. 
DATED this 23rd day of April, 2007. 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
Curtis J.T5?ake 
Troy L. ^Tooher 
Chris Martinez 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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O P I N I O N : This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs appeal (Docket # 313) of the 
Magistrate Judge's order striking Plaintiffs expert witnesses (Docket # 310). For the reasons 
that follow, the order of the Magistrate Judge is affirmed. 
I. 
This matter was referred to voluntary facilitative mediation by this Court on October 2 1 , 
2005. The notice of appointment of facilitative mediator outlined the procedures for 
mediation and, among other things, provided that "all information disclosed during the 
mediation session, including the conduct and demeanor of the parties and their counsel 
during the proceedings, must remain confidential, and must not be disclosed to any other 
party nor to this court, without consent of the party disclosing the information." (Notice of 
Appointment of Facilitative Mediator, at 2, docket # 94.) 
Subsequently, at the direction of the mediator, the parties furnished mediation statements 
and accompanying documents, highlighting those portions of the exhibits the parties believed 
to be [ * 3 ] most important. The Magistrate Judge found, and Plaintiff Irwin has not disputed, 
that Irwin later provided Defendants' mediation statements and accompanying highlighted 
documents to two experts expected to testify for Plaintiff at tr ial. 
On April 18, 2006, Plaintiff produced two expert reports, one by Jeff Hagins assessing the 
liability of the Defendants, and the other by Marianne DeMario assessing damages. Each 
expert report declared that the expert had reviewed the mediation briefs and exhibits 
produced by Defendants. DeMario's report extensively cited to portions of the mediation 
attachments. All of the attachments to the mediation statement were otherwise produced 
during discovery. However, the mediation attachments were highlighted to identify those 
portions Plaintiff believed to be significant to the case. 
The Magistrate Judge held that the mediation proceedings and documents were intended to 
be confidential and for settlement purposes only, pursuant to the order of appointment of 
mediator, W.D. MICH. LCIVR 16.2(e), FED. R. EVID. 408 and established Sixth Circuit case 
law. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that, regardless of whether Plaintiff [ * 4 ] acted with bad 
faith, Plaintiff was solely at fault for the breach of confidentiality and had acted intentionally 
to release the information. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that the exposure by 
Plaintiffs experts to Defendants' case theory could not simply be forgotten by those experts. 
Moreover, since any attempt to cross-examine those experts as to the specifics of their 
recollection would itself expose confidential information, the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
the only appropriate remedy was to strike Plaintiffs expert witnesses. 
Plaintiff now appeals the Magistrate Judge's order, contending that the sanction is unduly 
harsh and unsupported by law. 
II. 
Under 28 U.S.C. 5 636(b)(1)(A) and FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), a federal magistrate judge may 
be designated to hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters. Id. Rule 72(a) provides 
in relevant part: 
H / V 1?A magistrate judge to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim or 
defense of a party is referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such 
proceedings as are required and when appropriate enter into the record a written 
order [ * 5 ] setting forth the disposition of the matter. Within 10 days after being 
served with a copy of the magistrate judge's order, a party may serve and file 
objections to the order; a party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the 
magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made. The district 
judge to whom the case is assigned shall consider such objections and shall 
modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be 
clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). n l 
Footnotes 
n l * t t 2 y R u [ e 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implements 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 
(A). Massey v. City ofFemdale, 7 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 1993). 
End Footnotes-
H y v 3TA factual "finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is 
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Heights Cmty. 
Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1985). [ * 6 ] The question 
before the court "is not whether the finding is the best or only conclusion that can be drawn 
from the evidence, or whether it is the one which the reviewing court would draw. Rather, 
the test is whether there is evidence in the record to support the lower court's finding, and 
whether its construction of that evidence is a reasonable one." Id. 
H/V4
*?A magistrate is afforded broad discretion in the resolution of nondispositive discovery 
disputes, which this Court will overrule only if that discretion is clearly abused. See Dayco 
Prod., Inc. v. Walker, 142 F.R.D. 450, 454 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing Snowden v. Con naught 
Laboratories, Inc., 136 F.R.D. 694 f 697 (D. Kan. 1991); Detection Systems, Inc. v. Pittway 
Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Sil-Flo. Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1514 
(10th Cir. 1990)). 
III. 
In its objections to the Magistrate Judge's determination, Plaintiff argues only that the 
striking of its expert witnesses is an excessive sanction, not warranted by the nature of the 
violation. n2 Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge should have imposed a less [ * 7 ] 
severe sanction. Plaintiff contends that it did not act in bad faith to release the mediation 
materials, believing that disclosure to its own retained experts was disclosure to agents of 
itself, the represented party, and therefore was not a breach of confidentiality. While Plaintiff 
no longer asserts that its disclosure was not a violation of the mediation order and the local 
rules, it asserts that the reason for the disclosure did not amount to bad faith. Further, 
Plaintiff argues that the information contained in the mediation attachments was otherwise 
disclosed during discovery and fully available to the experts from other sources. For both 
reasons, Plaintiff contends that the harsh sanction of striking experts was not warranted. 
Footnotes 
n2 In its reply brief, Plaintiff raises two additional issues not raised before either the 
Magistrate Judge or in Plaintiff's initial timely objections. First, citing First Bank of Marietta v. 
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 519 (6th Cir. 2002), Plaintiff argues that a 
finding of bad faith is legally required to support the imposition of a sanction under the 
Court's inherent authority. Second, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge lacked evidence 
to support a finding that Plaintiff's disclosure of mediation materials to the experts had an 
adverse impact on Defendants or on the mediation process. Neither argument was raised in 
Plaintiffs objections. H /V57Under FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a), "a party may not thereafter assign as 
error a defect in the magistrate judge's order to which objection was not timely made." Id. 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized that arguments raised for the first t ime 
in a party's reply brief are waived. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 743 
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (deeming 
arguments that are not raised in the appellant's main brief, or raised merely in a perfunctory 
manner, as waived)); see also Lexicon, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 436 F.3d 
662, 676 (6th Cir. 2006) (a district court properly declines to consider an issue raised for the 
first t ime in a reply brief) (citing, Sundberg v. Keller Ladder, 189 F. Supp. 2d 671 , 682-83 
(E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting, in the context of summary judgment, "it is not the office of a reply 
brief to raise issues for the first t ime") (citation omitted)). For both reasons, the arguments 
raised in Plaintiff's reply brief are waived, and the Court declines to address either argument. 
Encj Footnotes [ * 8 ] 
As the Magistrate Judge fully discussed, the local court rules specifically provide for the 
confidentiality of ADR procedures such as voluntary facilitative mediation: 
H/v6+Confidentiality — information disclosed during the ADR process shall not be 
revealed to any one else without consent of the party who disclosed the 
information. All ADR proceedings are considered to be compromised negotiations 
within the meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 408. n3 
V Il i II III 111 I  t Ik !«' Hi,."in 1  lii iKhlitiuii, as HNrfthQ Sixth circuit repeatedly has recognized. 
There exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy of matters discussed by 
~'
3
^ies during settlement negotiations. This is true whether settlemei it 
..cyOtiations are done under the auspices of the court or informally between the 
parties. The ability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more 
efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system. In 
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties n in ist feel i n linhibited in tl leii 
coi i imunications. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 
2003). T*91 
Footnotes 
n 3 wvgyRU |e 4Q3 p r0vides in n-ievant part !h..j» ;eK;defue of conduct or statements made in 
compromised negotiations is likewise WVA A-\V ssible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise elisor •• ••'-: - *--><:?'ro " "• pre-- -nf—-< — i U~ course of 
compromised negotiations. . . . 
- End Footnote'-
Iri determining that the sanction of striking experts was appropriate, the Magistrate Judge 
made a number of factual determinations. First, he noted that Plaintiff conceded that its 
attorneys had provided copies of Defendants' mediation briefs and exhibits to the experts, 
and both experts acknowledged reading the materials. Indeed, Plaintiff's damages expert 
repeatedly referred to the mediation exhibits in her expert report. Although both experts 
averred that they did not recall Defendants' mediation positions and further averred that 
their opinions were not influenced by their knowledge of those positions, the Magistrate 
Judge found those averments unpersuasive. The Magistrate Judge noted that the experts had 
used [ * 1 0 ] essentially identical language in their affidavits and that the averments in 
question appeared to have been drawn up by the same hand. 
The Magistrate Judge further fuuitd that, regardless of Plaintiffs intent in disclosing the 
documents, the experts had tecc-Tvtid confidential information. The Magistrate Juclifc" 
concluded that no adequate means existed for undoing the experts1 improper knowledge. As 
the Magistrate Judge noted, the facts upon which an expert relies are not required to be 
admissible. However, the factual basis for the expert's opinion is subject to inquiry and cross-
examination. FED. R. EVID. 703. Because the information in issue is confidential, Defendants 
will be unable to fully challenge the experts' assertions that their opinions were not 
ir ifluenced by confidential settlement knowledge. 
Although Plaintiff continues to argue that the experts were i lot ii ifluei iced by the confidential 
• : : •! intent of the mediation briefs or the highlighting of specific portions of the otherwise 
discoverable exhibits, the Magistrate Judge's reasons for discrediting the experts' claims are 
reasonable. The Court finds no basis for concluding that the finding is [ * 1 1 ] clearly 
erroneous. Accepting, therefore, that the experts did remember the mediation positions and 
that they were, consciously oi i; n consciously affected by that information the Magistrate 
Judge's decision to excli icie the experts was reasonable and soi in id, 
Furttlei, contrary to Plaintiffs argument, the Magistrate Judge's decision to strike Plaintiffs 
experts is not inconsistent with other federal decisions. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber, applying 
the mediation confidentiality privilege,, the Sixth Circuit t ipheld the district court's refusal to 
permit discovery about settlement negotiations to support a plaintiffs claim that a witness 
had been bribed. 332 F,3d at 983. The court recognized that disclosure of settlement 
negotiations, even long after those negotiations had failed, would undermine the public policy 
underlying settlement. WLat_980. The court further held that, because settlement 
negotiations "are typically punctuated with numerous instances of puffing and posturing since 
they are motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession of the merits of the 
c la im/" the use of "these sort of 'facts' would be highly misleading if allowed [ * 1 2 ] to be 
used for purposes other than settlement." Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 332 F.3d at 981 (quoting 
United States v. Contra Costa County Water Dist, 678 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
Similarly here,, pei n littii ig plaintiffs experts to testify after having had access to Defendants' 
confidential representations has the potential to undermine the willingness of parties to 
engage in future settlement negotiations. Further, the "facts" upon which those experts rely 
in such briefing have the potential to be misleading because of the purpose for which they 
are presented. They therefore may color the expert's conclusions based on a characterization 
of the facts distorted by the goal of settlement, In any event, the information provides the 
expert with information about the other party's view of tl le significance of particular 
evidence. 
The -th Circuit did not approve the identical sanction does not demonstrate 
the L ;«;.„« obs of the sanction imposed in this case. The facts of Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber did not call for the striking of an expert. Instead, the problem was fully able to be 
addressed by the denial of discovery. Here, in contrast, [ * 1 3 ] Plaintiff cannot identify an 
alternate sanction that will adequately address these experts' improper knowledge. No 
admonition, reprimand, mediation training or assessment of costs can remove from the 
experts' minds the information to which they have been exposed, And, because of the 
ongoing confidentiality of the mediation process, such alternatives cannot remove the 
obstacle to Defendants' cross-examination of the experts. 
The remaining cases cited by plaintiff are equally unpersuasive. For example, in Frank v. L L 
Bean Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Me. 2005), the court declined to exclude the fruits of an 
ex parte interview with a potential witness in which the opposing party's settlement position 
was revealed. The court instead imposed financial sanctions. In Frank, however, the party 
violating settlement confidentiality revealed information to a former employee of the 
opposing party, who shared the opposing party's interests. As a result, the opposing party 
could not demonstrate prejudice arising from the breach of confidentiality, The court 
expressly noted that, " [h jad Defendant been able to demonstrate such prejudice, such a 
sanction might have been an [ * 1 4 ] appropriate remedy to counteract Plaintiffs ill-gotten 
advantage." Frank. 311 F. Supp. 2d at 240-41. 
Here, Plaintiff disclosed Defendants' settlement positions to its owi i expert witnesses. That 
information is inherently prejudicial to Defendants and is an "ill-gotten advantage," even if 
the extent of the prejudice is not precisely measurable. In such circumstances, the 
Magistrate Judge's order striking Plaintiffs expert witnesses, is both reasonable and 
consistent with the analysis of Frank. 
In In re AnonymouSr 283 F.3d 627 (4tt\ Cir, ZUUZJ, i k ;, ., . u^» . -
the confidentiality of the appellate mediation process. The tou ; l . v j n d thai u c n i 
counsel and local counsel had all violated the confidentiality requirements of the n, p Mte 
mediation process during their subsequent bar-mediated fee dispute. The court, however, 
weighing the totality of the circumstances, declined to issue sanctions for several reasons. 
The court found tl iat i IOI ie of the participants had acted h i bad faitl i. 1 1 le court further foi ind 
that the disclosures to another confidential forum did not severely impact the effectiveness of 
the mediation [ * 1 5 ] process. Further, the court noted that, in light of the breaches by all 
parties, no single party was harmed by the disclosures. 1d. at 635-36. 
The in /c anonymous decision is fully consistent with the Magistrate Judge's determination in 
the instant case. The case endorses the notion that " ^ ^ s a n c t i o n s determinations are to be 
based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Here, unlike in In re Anonymous, the only 
party breaching confidentiality is the party with the opportunity to benefit from that breach, 
Moreover, the breach did not occur within the confines of another confidential process, but 
instead permitted an expert to offer an opinion influenced by confidential information upon 
which he could not be fully cross-examined. As the Magistrate Judge found, such a breach 
has the potential to seriously undermine the effectiveness of the mediated settler i nent 
proceedings, thereby undermining important public policy. 
A review us riainini 'b remailting citations to unpublished decisions in which sanctions have 
been denied reveals substantial differences in the totality of the circumstances from those 
before this Court. See Frazierv. Layne Christensen Co., No. 04-C-315-C, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2358, 2005 WL 372253 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 11 , 2005): [ * 1 6 ] Concerned Citizens v. 
Belle Haven Club, No. 3.-99CV1467, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26117 (D. Conn. Oct. 25, 2002). 
Plaintiff has identified no comparable disclosure to that in issue here. 
Moreover, thu I:K- ; H J : .:-.., otl lei distr ict coui t n lay have decided a sanctions question 
erently than the Magistrate Judge does not in itself suggest that the Magistrate Judge's 
abuse of discretion. See Heights Cmty. Congress, 774 F.2d at 140 
. . . . ..or the determination is the best or only conclusion that can be drawn 
but whether it is a reasonable one.) The Court finds that the factual determinations of the 
Magistrate Judge were not clearly erroneous and that the striking of Plaintiffs experts is not 
contrary to law. Accordingly, tf ie Court will affirm the Magistrate Judge's order to strike, 
-.iig agreed that the Magistrate Judge properly struck Plaintiffs expert witnesses as a 
"!•/ for Plaintiffs breach of mediation confidentiality, the Court must determine whether 
may retain other experts. The Court has reviewed the totality of the circumstances 
and finds that [* 17 ] a complete denial of expert witnesses would be an excessive sanction, 
not warranted by the nature of Plaintiffs conduct. The harm to Defendants is fully mitigated 
by the exclusion of the testimony of those experts exposed to the confidential information. 
The striking of experts is itself a harsh sanction and should not be made greater by the 
exclusion of all expert evidence in support; of Plaintiffs case. Accordingly, notwithstanding the 
late stage of these proceedings the r our t will permit Phintiff to engage new experts, 
IP f. 
Foi tl ie foregoing reasons, the Court affirms the order of the Magistrate Judge striking 
Plaintiffs experts. The Court, however, will permit Plaintiff to designate new experts. In 
accordance with the Magistrate Judge's order denying clarification (Docket # 323), deadlines 
for expert reports will be addressed in the scheduling conference to be held after resoliition 
of the dispositive motions. 
Dated: Febm- * J07 
-i l 
„.'«i'. IN11 ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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I I JD^ 
OPINION BY: Hug! •  i - i e m ^ n ^ 
OPIN ION: ORDER STRIKING EXPERT WITNESSES 
Pending before the coui t is a motion by defendant International Business Mad lii les 
Corporation ("IBM") to strike plaintiffs experts due to Irwin Seating Company's ("Irwhi'"") 
violation of mediation confidentiality (docket no, 1 95), Defendant J.D. Edwards World 
Solutions Company has joined in IBM's motion, 
Defendant IBM bases its motior i on the fact Uv i )roperly supplied its testifying 
experts with confidential mediation statements and exhibits obtained during a mediation 
between the parties, and that the experts reviewed these documents in rendering their 
opinions 
- d U u was sei it to volui itary facilitative - .... .. . . ^ b e r 2 1 , 2005 > »J i 
entered by the court several days later w*\u ^ b for the mediation, 
provided that "all information disclosed durirn. :» •- mediation session, including the conduct 
-
4
 iemeanor of the parties and their counsel during the proceedings, must remain 
wi inJent ia l , and must not be disclosed [ * 3 ] to any other party nor to this court, without 
consent of the party disclosing the information i " Order of November 2, 2005. 
At the direction of the mediator, the parties each fun lished to I iei i nediation statements and 
accompanying documents, highlighting those portions of the exhibits the defendants believed 
to be the most important. IBM asserts, and Irwin does not deny, that Irwin subsequently 
provided its experts with the defendants' confidential mediation statements accompanying 
the documents, which explain the importance of certain documents and why they were 
selected. The documents were also highlighted at the request of the mediator to indicate 
those portions of the documents that the defendants believed to be the most important 
C)i in pi il 1 8 , 2 0 0 6 , lii in i |: i : - :!ii r :• = :ll 1: : *: :p • = i I: mi eports, one by Jeff Hagins assessing the 
liabilit ; of the defei i :laii its ail i ::I till v 2 o i l : ! 1 BSI Ill: j II! I l l a i iiai me DeMario pertaining to damages. Each 
• = [: • = 1 1: 1 = | : • : 1 ill: = |: 1i :itl ; = tc t : s • till IE ill: till = t the mediation material produced by 
IBM and J.D. E< " ' See E : w 1: II I = |: • ' 0. 40 ("I have reviewed all of the 
mediation exh ib i t ! J.L). Edwam-, m oe^i ing.") ; Expert Report of 
Marianne [ * 4 ] L. Exhibit B to ti r t ("Documents Reviewed by Mariaiine 
DeMario IBM mediation letter, 1/11/06. . C to IBM mediation letter; Exhibit F to 
JDE mediation brief. . . Exhibit G to IBM mediation letter, J.D. Edwards World Solutions 
Company's Confidential Mediation Brief, 1/12/06. . . .Exhibit G to JDE mediation brief. . . 
Exhibit A to JDE mediation brief). DeMario also cites to the mediation materials throughout 
the text of her opinion. Id. at 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Irwin acknowledges that the mediation 
briefs and attached exhibits "were provided to Mr. Hagins and Ms. DeMario as background 
and were used by them as such." Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to IBM's Motion, filed May 22, 
2006, at 3. 
Confidentiality Rule 
It is beyor id question that the n lediatioi 1 pi oceedings ii 1 ti lis case were intended to be 
: : 1 f ii ilentiai, and for settlei 1 lei it pi 11 poses only The explicit order of the court was sufficient 
1 iotice of this fact to the parties witl toi it 1 1 101 e. 
But there was rnoi e. The November 15, 2,005 letter froi n the mediator to the parties 
reiterated that " [ t ]he mediation process is confidential." In reliance upon this, IBM states that 
each page of its mediation [ * 5 ] statement was clearly marked in bold print: 
"CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY." 
Moreover, I he looil court rules specifically provide for the < onfidentiahty ot ADR procedures 
such as voluntas facihtative mediation. W.D Midi LOv H 16.2(e) provides: 
Confidentiality information disclosed during the ADR process shall not be 
revealed to any one else without consent of the party who disclosed the 
information. All ADR proceedings are considered to be compromised negolidlions 
within the meaning of Federal Rules of Evidence 408. n l 
1 he Sixth U n u i t has long recognized that 
"*[t)here exists a strong public interest in favor of secrecy ot matters discussed by 
parties during settlement negotiations. This is true whethet settlement 
negotiations are done under the auspices of the court or inlormally between Hit 
parties. The liability to negotiate and settle a case without trial fosters a more 
efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial system In 
order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in th ir 
communications." (emphasis added) 
[ * 6 ] Goodyear Tire & Rubber v Chiles Power Supply, 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003). In 
deciding to recognize the existence of a settlement privilege protecting settlement 
communications, the court noted that 
"confidential settlement communications are a ti adition in this country. See, e.g., 
Palmier/ v New York, 719 F.2d 861 , 865 (2nd Cir. 1985) (citing In Re: Franklin 
Natl Bank, 92 FRD 468, 472 (E.P.N.Y. 1981)) (stating that "[sjecrecy of 
settlement terms. . . is a well-established American litigation practice"). This 
Court has always recognized the need for, and the constitutionality of, secrecy in 
settlement proceeding (ntat inn c omitted)." Id. at 980. 
In summary, the court held that "any communications made in furtherance of settlement are 
privileged." Id. 983. 
Iootnotes 
n l Rule 408 provides in pertinent pari t vidence of conduct or statements made in 
compromised negotiations is likewise not ulimssible. This rule does not require the exclusion 
of any evidence otherwise disrovehili l i n n i»h because it r presented in the enure nf 
compromised negotiations... 
Lncj F-ootnotes-
III ' III 
Violation of the Conflict Rule 
Fhere is also no question but 11 uL li win's lawyers provided copies of IBM's and Jul •: 
mediation briefs and exhibits to the experts. See Affidavit of Jeff 1, Hagins dated May 19, 
2006 at P 3; Affidavit of Marianne L. DeMario dated May 19, 2006 at P 3. While both experts 
deny either of the mediation briefs from the defendants influenced them in developing their 
opinion, they both admit they read these mediation statements as they began their analysis. 
Mr Hagins stated, "I did read both IBM's and JDE's mediation briefs once, as part of my 
iilitial reading of foundational materials,. . . in order to gain some sense of what the case was 
about. I read these mediation briefs on mv computer in the electronic format in wt lich they 
were provided to me." i 1a.r-<- n" f "•* 
Ms. DeMario states. "I read the mediation brief for context, when I first started working on 
my damages analysis. . .." Ms. DeMario explains that she "cited certain documents as 
exhibits to the mediation briefs for the sake of simplicity, since it was easier to cite them that 
way than to locate the same documents among the thousands of pages of materials that had 
been provided f * 8 " * ••. • •* m's lawyers" DeMario's affidavit at 6. n2 
, uotnotes 
n2 This protestation proves too i i iuc:l i, since by utilizing ti le exhibits attached to defendants* 
briefs throughout her analysis, rather than the bates-stamped versions, she was, necessarily, 
repeatedly pi filed back to defendants' briefs and their marked up "opies of the documents. 
__F j | • :)otnotes 
Both experts claim they do not recall what the defendants' mediation positions were, but in 
this context the affidavits are not particularly persuasive since it is readily apparent both 
were drawn up by the same hand. For example, Mr, Hagins testifies in paragraph 7 of his 
affidavit 
I il nnl c i ii in I ill! ui'b ill IBM' . iniill IMI . incdhilmmil positions were", 
I liil'iE I Is C sf l a II ii' : • s t a t e s in n pa i agii apl i ^ :: f I lei all 1 Ida it: 
"I don't even recall what were IBM's ai id JDE's n mediation positions," 
Plaintiff does not deny the documents were confidential documents nor that its lawyers 
provided them to the plaintiffs experts, nor that the plaintiff's experts reviewed these 
documents [ * 9 ] in preparing their reports. Rather, plaintiffs defense is an attempt to 
minimize the impact these disclosures had and to argue that the sanction requested by 
defendants ~ that these experts be stricken as expert witnesses — is too severe. 
-nds that plaintiff's conduct was in direct derogation of the order of this court, tl r 2 
J
 mmon understanding of the purpose for which the 
J. Clearly the mediation briefs and the marked-up 
-nents attache? to them constituted settlement communicatioi is. While defendants • 
4
 V acknowledge that the documents themselves were otherwise producible to the 
s experts, they persuasively argue that the mediation reports themselves, and the 
'03 of portions of documents especially selected by the defendants as referred to in 
their mediation reports, were communications subject to the settlement privilege, not grist 
for the experts' mill. 
Impact of Violation of Confidentiality 
The court need not find a bad intent on the part of Irwin's lawyers in furnishing all of these 
materials to their experts. What the court does f ind, whatever the intent, [ * 1 0 ] was that 
these documents were furnished on purpose for the experts to review, and they were in fact 
reviewed. This is the reality of the situation confronting the court, and it is a dilemma created 
solely by the actions of plaintiff's own lawyers. 
Nor does the problem end here since these reports are now a part of the record used by the 
plaintiff's experts, and the experts are subject to cross-examination on them. Any cross-
examination, of course, runs a risk of touching on the privileged communications. Moreover, 
and perhaps more significantly, there is no adequate way to assess the impact the mediation 
briefs had on the experts, and how the experts may have shaped their evaluations 
consciously or unconsciously in response to the claims made and positions taken by 
defendants in their mediation briefs. Even in denying any recall of what defendants' positions 
were in their reports, both experts concede these briefs were among the first documents they 
read, "in order to gain some sense of what the case was about." n3 The bell has been rung. 
There are simply some things that cannot be forgotten once they are learned. 
Footnotes 
n3 By way of analogy, apropos to this time of the year, if a football coach learns that his 
opponent for next week's game is relying on his team's ability to pass to a particular deep 
receiver, the coach learning this will doubtlessly concentrate his attention on strategies to 
cover that receiver. 
End Footnotes [*11] 
Moreover, plaintiff's counsel's behavior in sharing these materials with unauthorized persons 
strikes at the heart of the ADR process. 
Striking an expert witness is a harsh remedy, but not an unfair one, where a party has 
placed its experts at risk by infusing them with knowledge to which they were not entit led. 
The risk should not be upon the innocent defendants in this instance. The extent of the 
damage done in terms of how much these mediation briefs and the highlighted documents 
affected the experts, again consciously or unconsciously, in shaping their approaches and 
their opinions, is not truly knowable nor easily remediable. Where this situation arises from a 
clear violation of the court's order and the settlement privilege generally, it is the plaintiff 
that must bear the brunt of the resolution. 
Defendant's motion is GRANTED, and plaintiffs experts Hagins and DeMario are stricken as 
experts and shall not testify in this action. n4 Movant IBM is also awarded costs and 
attorney's fees in the amount of $ 1,000.00, payable within 30 days. See, Rules 26(c) and 37 
(a)(4). I f either party objects within 10 days of this order to the amount assessed, IBM shall, 
within 7 days thereafter, [ * 1 2 ] provide an affidavit together with any supporting 
documentation justifying the amount it believes is appropriate (more or less than $ 
1,000.00), and plaintiff shall have 7 days thereafter to file an appropriate response. The 
court may schedule a further hearing on the question of costs if it deems it necessary. 
Footnotes 
n4 The court is aware this resolution may also have a salutary effect in preserving 
confidences of future mediation participants, and the candor necessary to successful 
facilitative mediations. A contrary result would certainly have a dramatically contrary impact. 
End Footnotes 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: November 29, 2006 
/s/ Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr. 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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